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“ACQUIRED WIT” IN HOBBESIAN EDUCATION 
DANIEL JOSPEH SOLECKI 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis analyzes and evaluates the scheme for civil education discussed in 
Thomas Hobbes’ political works. Hobbes argues in The Elements of Law, De Cive, and 
Leviathan that the preservation of political order requires that all subjects learn the 
rationally grounded principles of political theory. Some contemporary scholarship on this 
aspect of Hobbes’ political philosophy has confined its understanding of “Hobbesian 
education” to this: the sovereign’s system of true civil doctrines and the means for their 
dissemination. I argue that for the system of Hobbesian civil doctrines to function as it is 
intended, a public must also receive instruction in formal argumentation, a skill Hobbes 
calls “acquired wit” (L viii.13). I will show that the subjects’ cultivation of their 
individual reasoning abilities is required so the subjects are able to (1) understand the 
philosophical foundations of the sovereign’s power, (2) sufficiently resist the allure of 
obfuscating eloquence and other falsehoods, and (3) conduct themselves in accordance 
with Hobbes’ natural laws. Civil peace in a Hobbesian system requires that the public be 
able to tell the difference between sound and unsound inferences. If Hobbes did intend 
for the sovereign to instruct the public in “acquired wit,” contemporary scholars who 
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“ACQUIRED WIT” IN HOBBESIAN EDUCATION 
Introduction 
 In Chapter viii of Leviathan, Hobbes makes a distinction between “natural wit” 
and “acquired wit” (L viii.2-13). “Natural wit” refers to mental acuity developed through 
life experience; “acquired wit” refers to the use of “reason,” which is developed through 
formal instruction (L viii.13-14). This paper will explore the connections between 
Hobbes’ concept of “acquired wit” and his account of the aims and principles of civil 
education. I will show that the stability of a Hobbesian system requires that Hobbes’ civil 
education scheme include training the public in the use of reason. 
Once the Hobbesian contractarian story is run through, and people have emerged 
out of the state of nature and established a sovereign, two complementary forces preserve 
the civil peace: (1) the subjects’ fear of the sovereign’s coercive authority and (2) the 
subjects’ education in the true doctrines of civil science. Hobbes argues that since fear 
alone cannot compel the subjects’ obedience, civil education of the public is a 
necessary—but not sufficient—condition for the survival of a state. This raises a number 
of questions. Exactly what sort of “education” does Hobbes envision? 
As several recent scholars have noted, Hobbes wants subjects taught the truth 
about politics. Citing this aspect of Hobbesian theory, contemporary philosophers like 
Jeremy Waldron and S.A. Lloyd have interpreted Hobbesian education as a precursor of 
Enlightenment liberalism (Lloyd 1997; Waldron 2001). However, this characterization 
has seemed to some scholars to be too generous an appraisal for a view that also 
advocates the suppression of opposing doctrines and the outlawing of dissent. For 
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instance, Teresa Bejan has argued that Hobbes’ education scheme is designed to promote 
unthinking obedience to the sovereign’s commands and civil dogmas (Bejan 2010). On 
this interpretation, Hobbes’ interest in “imprinting” subjects is quite far from any sort of 
education program we might call even remotely “liberal” (Bejan 2010: 615-618). In this 
paper, I hope to address an aspect of Hobbesian education that Lloyd, Waldron, and 
Bejan pass over: Hobbes’ enthusiasm for “acquired wit.” Hobbes’ system of civil 
doctrines that receives attention in the work of these scholars is an incomplete picture of 
Hobbesian education. If my argument holds, and Hobbes was indeed committed to 
teaching scientific reasoning to the general public, Lloyd and Waldron’s conclusions 
about Hobbes as a proto-liberal are further vindicated. 
I make a distinction here between an education by acquaintance with certain 
authoritative propositions and an education that cultivates certain skills. The role of this 
second kind of education has been underexplored in Hobbes scholarship, but is 
invaluable for the aims of the Hobbesian civil education scheme. Insofar as Hobbes 
argues that subjects should be taught the arguments that ground the sovereign’s authority, 
subjects must learn how to interpret these arguments and understand the sequence of their 
propositions. Secondly, as Hobbes deems the equivocal use of speech to be among the 
chief threats to internal stability, subjects must learn “acquired wit” to be intellectually 
fortified against “abuses of language” (L iv.4). Furthermore, insofar as moral reasoning 
for Hobbes demands making sound inferences from true principles (L xxvii.12), 
Hobbesian subjects must learn how to properly draw moral conclusions from the natural 
laws. While the sovereign’s instruction of the public in true doctrines reinforces the 
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public’s intellectual tenacity, part of this tenacity must also be rooted in the subjects’ 
ability to recognize sound reasoning when they see it. This can only be achieved, 
according to Hobbes himself, by careful study in the practice of ratiocination (L viii.14). 
After outlining Hobbes’ account of civil doctrines and the treatment of this issue in recent 
scholarship, I will outline Hobbes’ views on the uses and abuses of speech. Given 
Hobbes’ claims about the perils of false reasoning, I will present three arguments for why 
the Hobbesian system requires that subjects learn “acquired wit.” 
 
The Doctrine System in Hobbes’ Scheme for Civil Education 
Hobbes grounds his view of education on the notion that public opinion 
determines whether the civil state prevails. In Elements of Law, Hobbes claims that we 
always act in light of our opinions about the rewards or punishments that we imagine 
result from a particular course of action (EL I.12.6). If the subjects hold opinions that 
give them “pretense of right” to rebel, and if the subjects are also ill-disposed towards the 
sovereign and have “hope of success,” these seemingly innocent opinions will bring 
about sedition (EL II.8.4). In the De Cive version of this discussion, Hobbes claims that if 
the sovereign espouses the wrong sort of doctrines or does not espouse any doctrines at 
all, subjects are liable to take on opinions that will incline them toward rebellion (DC 
vi.11). The sovereign then has the right to both (1) decide which doctrines are inimical to 
peace and (2) suppress the public teaching of those doctrines (DC vi.11). 
How does the sovereign decide which doctrines to allow and which to forbid? In 
the note to DC vi.11, Hobbes claims that there is no field of knowledge in which disputes 
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will not arise. Inevitable disagreements can ultimately result in violent confrontation (DC 
vi.11n). The tendency of disputes to end in violence is the consequence of the pride 
human beings take in their own supposed intelligence and in their emotional motivations 
to vindicate themselves (DC vi.11n). Given this unfortunate fact of human nature, the 
sovereign will not be able to manage all opinions, but will be able to focus attention on 
regulating the most seditious doctrines—the doctrines that suggest the subjects obey an 
entity other than the civil sovereign (DC vi.11n). Hobbes is particularly concerned about 
doctrines that demand obedience either to God or to a religious institution at the expense 
of the sovereign (DC vi.11n). Since any ambiguity about obedience is inimical to civil 
peace, doctrines that give political credibility to ecclesiastical powers should be 
rigorously suppressed (DC vi.11n). 
In the Leviathan version of this argument, Hobbes claims that the sovereign could 
decide which doctrines to teach by appealing to a different qualification: whether or not 
the doctrines are true. Hobbes claims that when the sovereign plans the content of the 
civil education program, “in matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded except for 
truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace” (L xviii.9). If true 
doctrines are publicly taught to all subjects, civil peace reigns. What is so special about 
truth that makes true doctrines conducive to peace? A few of the early chapters of 
Leviathan offer a plausible interpretation. It is important to note what Hobbes means by 
“truth.” In Chapter iv, Hobbes gives a definition of truth—it is the “right ordering of 
names” whereby the concept that one name signifies is contained in the signification of 
another term (L iv.12). Coming to this right ordering demands beginning our inquiries 
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with settled definitions and reasoning to new conclusions. The signs that we have attained 
what Hobbes calls “science”—that is, certain knowledge of what follows from settled and 
correct definitions for concepts—are that we can “demonstrate the truth [of the 
propositions] perspicuously to another” (L v.22). Although Hobbes does not explicitly 
use the contemporary language of a community of ideal reasoners “converging” upon a 
publicly perspicuous truth, Hobbes suggests something at least similar: that truth enjoys a 
special kind of clarity, universality, and public availability (L iv.9-12). By contrast, 
falsehood necessarily inspires confusion and disagreement, which leads to war (L v.20). 
Therefore, when Hobbes claims that the sovereign can regulate peace by means of true 
doctrines, this is tantamount to saying that the doctrines ought to be demonstrable, 
publicly, and recognized as true by any reasoning subject. The perspicuous 
demonstrability of true doctrines generates the public’s accord. 
To take an illustrative example of a particular doctrine Hobbes considers 
“repugnant” to peace, we can consider the Aristotelian notion that virtues are defined by 
“the mediocrity [mean] of the passions” (L xv.40). Hobbes claims that this doctrine is 
false and leads to sedition (L xv.40). What makes this so? Hobbes argues that given that 
our appetites and aversions are always mutable and ambiguous, if we take the measure of 
our appetites and aversions to define the virtues, we can never arrive at a fixed definition 
of what is “good” and what is “evil” (L xv.40). If this false Aristotelian doctrine is 
publicly taught, disputes about morality will end up amounting to an irreconcilable 
conflict of personalities, and thus lead to conflict. It is not merely the case that certain 
opinions are harmful because they give people “pretense of right” to rebel or obfuscate 
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their political obligations, it is that these harmful doctrines are demonstrably false. They 
are, as doctrines, developed from erroneous or ambiguous principles and cannot generate 
solid accord among the public. They do not count as civil science. 
The idea that subjects should learn the true rational grounds of their political 
obligation is a new direction in political thought (Lloyd 1997: 46-47). The major figures 
in Hobbes’ own tradition had not granted common people the right to learn the 
foundations of politics, let alone taken up the universal teaching of political philosophy as 
a functioning cogwheel in their philosophical systems. According to the figures of the 
Renaissance’s Neo-Ciceronian tradition of civil education, political unity is achieved by 
the eloquence of great orators who, by combining true principles with appeals to common 
pathos and theatrical displays of rhetorical tropes, direct the public into a stable order 
(Skinner 2002: 69-72). In Machiavelli’s Discourses, the ruler is actually encouraged to 
manipulate subjects and lie to them about the principles of government (Lloyd 1997: 46-
47). Hobbes’ view of civil education is a remarkable contrast to these positions. Hobbes 
takes political pacification to be the result of public enlightenment—the public’s capacity 
to learn the arguments that ground the true principles of government. 
Hobbes is well aware of his place in the history of political thought on this issue. 
In the preface of De Cive, Hobbes acknowledges that in antiquity, political theory was 
only given over to the public by the “pretty forms of poetry or in the shadowy outlines of 
Allegory” so that the supposedly “high and holy mystery of government” would not be 
admitted into the vagueness and confusion of public discourse (DC P.2). Knowledge of 
justice was thus “wrapped up in fables” (DC P.6). However, ever since Socrates and the 
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subsequent tradition, people who claim wisdom about morals and politics have produced 
a myriad of conflicting opinions (DC P.3). This is particularly dangerous because 
commonwealths can collapse from false philosophical principles (DC P.7) Although 
Hobbes does not use this metaphor in the De Cive preface (relying here on a different 
myth from classical antiquity), it is as if the Socratic tradition opened a Pandora’s Box 
that allowed the world to be overrun with competing political doctrines. Hobbes muses 
that if only people could learn that the sovereign’s civil laws and their interpretations are 
to be acknowledged as the true and only definitions of good and evil, the “war of the 
sword and war of the pens” (DC ED.7) would finally fade into the past, and subjects 
could find “the royal road to peace” (DC P.8). 
In Leviathan xxix and in the corresponding passages in the earlier works, Hobbes 
gets into the particulars of the false doctrines that lead to civil unrest (EL II.8.4; DC xii.1-
7; L xxix.6-14). In making this list, Hobbes reiterates and summarizes many of his 
fundamental principles. The first doctrine Hobbes identifies as inimical to peace is the 
belief that “every private man is judge of good and evil actions” (L xxix.6). While the 
individual judgement of good and evil is in fact true in the state of nature, this is only 
because without a sovereign to decide the meaning of good and evil, “good” and “evil” 
are merely terms used to describe people’s ever-mutable appetites and aversions (L vi.7). 
Hobbes claims that since “good” and “evil” do not track any fixed properties in nature, 
allowing subjects in a civil state to decide for themselves what is ultimately “good” will 
inevitably lead to confusion and eventually violence (L xviii.10). If people are taught that 
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they may dogmatically take up their own individual reason about the good as “right 
reason,” there will be no end to their conflict (L v.3).  
The cause of this dangerous ambiguity is ultimately a confusion about language. 
Since people fail to recognize that “good” is an “inconstant name” (L iv.24)—always 
unavoidably attached to the fickle passions of the person using the word—individual 
definitions of “the good” can provide no sound grounds for reasoning. Because of the 
danger of allowing such a morally freighted term to be manipulated by individual 
speakers, one of the primary duties of the sovereign is to be the final arbiter in decisions 
of what is to be called good and evil (L xviii.10). In the Hobbesian civil state, what is 
called “good” and “evil” is a matter decided exclusively by the sovereign’s commands, 
laid forth in the commonwealth’s system of indisputable civil laws and their authoritative 
interpretations (L xviii.11). Under such a system, “the good” is unambiguous: what is 
lawful is good, what is unlawful is evil. 
The second doctrine Hobbes describes as inimical to peace is the idea that it is a 
sin to act against conscience (L xxix.7). “Conscience” here denotes what Hobbes calls the 
“metaphorical” use of the term—the inner experience of God-given “secret facts and 
secret thoughts” that are sometimes claimed to be the foundations of an infallible moral 
sense (L vii.4). Hobbes deflates this notion; he argues that no assertion of “conscience” 
can be rightly taken as authoritative over the sovereign’s commands (L xxix.7). Hobbes 
claims that what is generally called “judgment” and what Calvinists and others call 
“conscience” are actually the same phenomenon (L xxix.7). “Conscience” is merely an 
honorific used by religiously inspired people “vehemently in love with their own new 
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opinions” (L vii.4). Taking an interior sense of “conscience” as the ultimate arbiter of 
good and evil is tantamount to treating one’s own judgment as superior to the 
sovereign’s. Furthermore, by agreeing with all one’s fellow subjects in a Hobbesian 
commonwealth to institute a sovereign, each subject has already authorized the 
sovereign’s actions (L xvii.13). In doing so, the subjects have already subordinated their 
private judgement of good and evil to the sovereign’s public judgment and have already 
consented to take up the civil laws as “public conscience” (L xxix.7). 
Hobbes also takes aim at another religious doctrine: that “faith and sanctity” are 
determined by “supernatural inspiration” and not by a sincere and meticulous 
interpretation of scripture (L xxix.8). The idea that anyone can claim divine inspiration is 
absurd, Hobbes argues, because if such were the case it would be possible for every 
believing Christian to consider themselves a prophet (L xxix.8). The various ways that 
such self-proclaimed prophets interpret scripture would inevitably be inconsistent, and 
thus invite conflict. Like the calling of conscience, the inner sense of divine inspiration 
also ends up assuming that individual reasoning is the judge of good and evil, which is 
irreconcilable with civil peace (L xxix.8). 
Hobbes next lists several other false civil doctrines that should be suppressed. 
Among these is the idea that the sovereign is subject to the civil laws (L xxix.9). This was 
the false doctrine that had sent Charles I to his execution just a few years before Hobbes 
published Leviathan. Hobbes claims that if the laws are set above the sovereign to 
provide a check on its behavior, then the sovereign is not a sovereign properly speaking 
at all. In a commonwealth governed by “rule of law” it is not the sovereign who issues 
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commands, but the commands—that is, the laws—themselves (L xxix.9). While this is 
certainly an agreeable arrangement for both Hobbes’ liberal descendants and his 
Aristotelian ancestors, rule of law runs afoul of several Hobbesian principles. The 
assignment of sovereignty is made, in part, to replace the unfixed and inconclusive moral 
reasoning characteristic of the state of nature with the orderly and unambiguous 
commands of one person or assembly (L xxix.9). The rule of law and not of a human 
sovereign adds an unresolvable ambiguity to this arrangement. According to Hobbes, 
since all laws are in need of interpretation (L xxvi.21), if the sovereign is subject to the 
civil laws, then the judge that interprets those laws is the sovereign of the sovereign (L 
xxix.9). Such a judge would be the true sovereign. Hobbes concludes that this 
arrangement produces an infinite regress of sovereigns and their judges, and so it must be 
false (L xxix.9). 
Hobbes lists several other doctrines to be suppressed. For instance, he argues that 
subjects should not be taught that property rights are inalienable (L xxix.10). The idea of 
property rights that exclude sovereign incursion is inconsistent because the subjects are 
ultimately only able to hold property insofar as there is a sovereign to preserve the civil 
peace (L xxix.10). The subjects’ granting themselves inalienable property rights prevents 
the sovereign from maintaining one of its chief duties: protecting the subjects (L xxix.10).  
Subjects must also be taught that sovereign power must not be divided, because 
then the divided parts of government will seek sovereignty over one another (L xxix.12). 
Subjects must also be taught not to envy the political structures of neighboring countries 
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because changing a government just for the sake of following the example of another 
nation will lead to a recurring pattern of civil disruption (L xxix.13). 
Among the most striking of Hobbes’ warnings about false doctrines is his claim 
that the Renaissance’s revival of Greek and Latin learning must be strictly regulated to 
prevent subjects from getting the wrong sort of inspiration from classical antiquity (L 
xxix.14). Hobbes notes that it is dangerously easy without “the antidote of solid reason” 
to enthusiastically take the ancient authors as offering not only exemplar cases of 
personal virtues, but also exemplars of civic virtues (L xxix.14). An untutored view of the 
ancients will inspire the belief that modern people ought to reproduce something like 
Periclean Athens or the Roman Republic. Hobbes claims that this misguided enthusiasm 
for antiquity has given modern people the false impression that killing a king is actually 
the noble act of “tyrannicide” and that the overthrow of a monarchy amounts to an 
emancipation from slavery (L xxix.14). Classical learning also gives subjects the notion 
that a commonwealth is made up of several “souls” in competition with one another, and 
that the “ghostly,” or religious soul of the state—and not the civil sovereign—could claim 
right to rule (L xxix.15). Since these specious inferences drawn from the works of 
classical antiquity are so dangerous, these works must be read only with the counsel of 
someone who can show their falsehoods (L xxix.14). 
Set in its historical context, Leviathan Chapter xxix sets up a far-reaching program 
to erase many of the prevailing intellectual trends of early modern Europe. Among the 
doctrines that Hobbes considers detrimental are those of taken from the Aristotelian 
tradition: that individual reasoners are capable of determining the true nature of good and 
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evil (L xxix.6), that the sovereign is subject to the rule of law (L xxix.9), and that killing 
unpopular rulers is a noble act (L xxix.14; cf. L xlvi 32-36). Hobbes also targets the 
Calvinist notions that divine conscience is the arbiter of good and evil and that holiness 
comes from an interior reception of the divine spirit (L xxix.7-8). He also confronts the 
Catholic idea that the established church has “ghostly” power over subjects (L xxix.15) 
and confronts the English constitutional tradition that sets monarch, parliament, and the 
common law in “mixed” government (L xxix.16). Hobbes claims to have proved these 
doctrines false and incapable of securing civil peace. In a creating a Hobbesian system, 
the predominant intellectual, religious, and legal traditions of early modern Europe are to 
be set aside. What ought to replace them? 
Hobbes’ education program is a plan for a cultural shift—a plan to use true 
philosophy to solve the social ills wrought by false philosophy. The notion that Hobbes is 
interested in making the culture of the Scientific Revolution the public culture has been 
explored at length in the work of David Johnston, particularly in his The Rhetoric of 
Leviathan (Johnston 1986; cf. 128-133). Indeed, this theme of civil education as a 
corrective for the past appears in all of Hobbes’ political works. In The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes claims that because civil unrest is brought about by erroneous opinions spread by 
the traditions of Aristotelianism and “sophistry,” the sovereign’s duty must include 
“perspicuously set[ting] down” true ideas about natural law, civil law, and roles of the 
sovereign (EL II.9.8). In De Cive Chapter xiii, Hobbes claims that it is the duty of the 
sovereign to “root out” the false doctrines of past philosophers that have been so 
deleterious by “gently” teaching the public the right doctrines (DC xiii.9). 
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I have so far outlined what Hobbes thinks should not be taught. I will turn now to 
his arguments justifying his civil education program and his account of the program’s 
content. In Chapter xxx of Leviathan, Hobbes introduces the civil education program as 
the solution for three different problems of political order: (1) that fear of punishment is 
not sufficient to compel the populace’s obedience (L xxx.4), (2) that an insufficiently 
instructed populace may be seduced into rebellion by a “public enemy” (L xxiii.6; L 
xxx.3), and (3) that an insufficiently instructed populace may misunderstand its “natural 
obligation” to obey the laws (L xxx.4).1 
Hobbes opens the discussion of civil education in Leviathan chapter xxx with the 
claim that without a public education program to give subjects a clear understanding of 
the grounds of government and political obligation, subjects are “easy to be seduced” by 
rival theories and “drawn to resist” the sovereign (L xxx.3). The invocation of “seduction” 
indicates a specific range of worries about how the subjects respond to the assertions of 
their fellow subjects. Hobbes’ hope here is that subjects who know the grounds of the 
sovereign’s right are resistant to false rhetoric; they are tenacious in their obedience 
because they understand the principles of their obedience. Without such clear, 
unequivocal understanding of the sovereign’s power and the valid arguments that ground 
it, subjects will be liable to believe anyone that tries to convince them of a doctrine that 
                                                        
1 Hobbes makes distinctions between these problems elsewhere in the text. In “Of the 
Public Ministers of Sovereign Power,” Hobbes argues that the sovereign must set up 
ministers for public education so that the public are “[1] more apt to live in godliness and 
in peace amongst themselves, and [2] resist the public enemy” (L xxiii.6). In “Of the 
Difference of Manners,” Hobbes lists “ignorance” of political obligation separately from 
other kinds of public ignorance (L xi.17-23). 
  
14 
sounds appealing.2 If the arguments grounding the sovereign’s power are publicly 
disseminated, subjects in a Hobbesian system would have these reasons as a perspicuous 
and rigorous standard to use as a measure against false doctrines. We can imagine that in 
a situation where a subject is putting forward a false or misleading doctrine, the subjects 
who hear it will not give it credence because the rival doctrine is inconsistent with the 
sovereign’s established truth. 
In the next paragraph, Hobbes gives another series of reasons for political 
education (L xxx.4). He claims that the grounds of government must be taught because 
without an understanding of the foundations of a sovereign’s right, subjects would not 
understand why they should obey the law at all (L xxx.4). Hobbes begins the argument 
here with the claim that the coercive power of the sovereign is alone not powerful enough 
to compel obedience to the civil laws (L xxx.4). The sovereign must use education as an 
auxiliary strategy. The subjects should be compelled to follow the laws by developing 
their own true understanding of why lawfulness is in their individual interest (L xxx.4). 
What Hobbes requires here is quite specific. Hobbes claims that in order to understand 
their political obligation, subjects must understand the natural law “that forbiddeth the 
violation of faith” (L xxx.4)—Hobbes’ natural law of “justice.” Having already either 
consented to the sovereign’s authority or formed an agreement with one another to obey 
the sovereign, if subjects are not acquainted with the natural law of justice that enjoins 
the keeping of contracts, they will not understand the reasons they ought to obey the 
                                                        
2 S.A. Lloyd takes up these issues in her consideration of the character of the “dupe” 
(Lloyd 2009: 326-328). 
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sovereign’s laws. The implication is that subjects ignorant of their “natural obligation” to 
keep their contracts are like the dangerous “fool” of Leviathan Chapter xv who claims 
there is no such thing as justice (L xv.4). Such misinformed subjects will not understand 
why they ought to keep their contracts with one another and obey the sovereign’s laws. 
Of course, a commonwealth comprised of such people cannot last. Therefore, the 
arguments that form the grounds of the sovereign’s right to make commands—including 
the foundations of natural law in the injunction to “seek peace” (L xiv.4)—must be made 
publicly perspicuous (L xxx.4). It is only by understanding the grounds of sovereign right 
in natural law that people will be able to understand that it is in their interest to obey the 
sovereign. 
If “natural obligation” is not properly taught, subjects will be lost in a confusion 
of their fear of the sovereign’s commands and their own mutable individual passions and 
appetites (L xxx.4). Not knowing the grounds of the sovereign’s right makes the subjects 
perilously confused about the sovereign’s exclusive right to the public exercise of 
punitive action. Subjects ignorant of the sovereign’s right are liable to take state 
punishment as outright hostility and be inclined to retaliate (L xxx.4).  
It is worth summarizing Hobbes’ fundamental claims here. Civil peace depends 
on whether or not the subjects understand the grounds of the sovereign’s power. Hobbes 
offers three reasons for why people must be thus taught: (1) that coercive force is not 
sufficient to compel obedience, (2) that teaching the true principles of government 
defends the populace against the public spread of erroneous doctrines, and (3) that 
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teaching true principles compels the subjects, in their own private deliberations, to know 
that obedience to the sovereign is morally required. 
Hobbes acknowledges that this kind of civil education is a very ambitious 
scheme. How could he expect the public to understand the niceties of the arguments that 
ground the sovereign’s power? We can recognize the radical quality of Hobbes’ proposal 
for political education in his extensive objection-anticipating in the immediately 
subsequent passages. Hobbes first responds forcefully to the objection that his scheme is 
unworkable because of the complexity of his ideas (L xxx.6). He claims that his doctrine 
only appears difficult because people are uninterested in following an argument prima 
facie contrary to common presuppositions (L xxx.6). Hobbes claims that politically 
powerful people do not want to accept his theory because they see it as a threat to their 
ambitions. Intellectuals do not want to accept the theory because it refutes their own 
conclusions and delegitimizes their work (L xxx.6). Hobbes reasons that he can dismiss 
objections made by such people—his usual interlocutors—because their judgment is 
clouded by their self-interest (L xxx.6). On the other hand, Hobbes speculates, common 
people rightly taught will surely be able to understand his positions. Unless common 
people are obstinate in believing received dogma, their minds “are like clean paper, fit to 
receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them” (L xxx.6). As if to 
quell the concerns those who might be uneasy with this image, Hobbes compares the 
potential of his education program to the spread of Christianity. Just as much of Europe 
was brought to believe miracles “against reason,” including transubstantiation, people 
should be even more inclined to believe a view that is drawn entirely from rational 
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principles (L xxx.6). If people can be made to believe in false miracles, Hobbes argues, 
then surely subjects are capable of believing the demonstrable truth of Hobbesian theory 
(L xxx.6). 
Other than the foundations of government and political obligation, what else 
should be taught? Hobbes lists a number of minor doctrines and policies to complement 
the subjects’ education in civil science. As a rhetorical device to frame these minor 
doctrines, Hobbes associates each with one or more of the Ten Commandments. Subjects 
should be taught not to overvalue the political systems of neighboring countries and 
should not overvalue “popular men” that may usurp or outshine the public role of the 
sovereign (L xxx.7-8). The sovereign authority also must teach that it is forbidden for 
subjects to criticize the sovereign (L xxx.9). Hobbes also recommends a civil Sabbath to 
be set aside for the public to hear their duties and civil laws read (L xxx.10). Having such 
a political holiday is essential because it makes sure the subjects will “be put in mind of 
the authority that maketh them laws” (L xxx.10). The common subjects’ political 
education also extends to the private domain. Taking a cue from the commandment to 
honor parents, Hobbes claims that children should be taught to understand sovereignty in 
terms of the political structure of the family (L xxx.11). Hobbes summarizes the later 
commandments with the claim that the sovereign is responsible for teaching the 
particulars of the law and the importance of equity in the justice system (L xxx.12-14). 
In his set of minor doctrines, Hobbes outlines two possible venues for civil 
education: the civil Sabbath and the family. These are only a part of the commonwealth’s 
doctrine system. The most important institution for disseminating doctrines are the 
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universities. Hobbes touches on this theme in each of his major political works. In 
Elements, Hobbes claims that teachers and preachers who have studied Aristotle and 
other ancient figures in universities are responsible for the spread of falsehoods such as 
the idea that individuals can be the judge of good and evil and that sedition is the 
people’s right (EL II.9.8). The ancient and scholastic authors taught at Oxbridge “have 
delivered nothing concerning morality and policy demonstrably”; their doctrines have 
merely won over the minds of modern readers “by eloquent sophistry” (EL II.9.8). If only 
these ancient thinkers could be replaced in the curriculum with Hobbesian theory, 
students in universities—“whose minds are yet as white paper”—would readily imbibe 
the truth about the foundations of law and sovereignty and be able to readily teach that 
truth to the people (EL II.9.8). 
The analogous passage in De Cive further elaborates these concerns about the role 
of universities in public discourse. How exactly have seditious opinions about the 
judgment of good and evil reached the general public? Hobbes accuses the way 
information trickles out of the universities (DC xiii.9). Most people, he claims, get their 
ideas about moral and political matters through “the pulpits of popular preachers” and 
from everyday conversations with people whose philosophical positions were forged out 
of what they remember of ancient authors they read during their university days (DC 
xiii.9). The regular repetition of these false propositions in everyday life has given people 
the impression that these propositions are true, when they are, in fact, “no more 
intelligible than if you took words by lot from an urn and strung them together” (DC 
xiii.9). By contrast, if true political doctrines are taught in universities, Hobbes’ rationally 
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grounded civil science would spread to the populace and contribute to the preservation of 
civil peace. 
In the Leviathan version of this passage, Hobbes associates part of the public’s 
misinformation with inattentiveness to civil science. Some people, either out of need or 
self-interest, are too focused on their private work or the pursuit of pleasure to learn the 
principles of science (L xxx.14). Because most people do not carefully study the 
principles of “natural justice” or any other science, they take their opinions from the 
available sources—their preachers and their neighbors who “plausibly seem wiser” in 
political or legal matters (L xxx.14). Because those subjects who make a “show of 
learning” and command an audience maintain their claims to authority by their university 
education, if this education is cleansed of its Aristotelian tint and takes up the true 
doctrines of politics, the phenomenon of common people taking their views from the 
apparently learned would be put to work in preserving civil peace (L xxx.14). Therefore, 
the path to lasting civil peace begins with providing the right sort of university education.  
In the passage on universities in Leviathan xxx Hobbes asks a rhetorical question, 
imagining an objector asking him “is it you [who] will undertake to teach the 
universities?” (L xxx.14). Hobbes seizes the setup for a performance of his dry wit. 
Hobbes replies “it is not fit, nor needful, for me to say either aye or no; for any man that 
sees what I am doing may easily perceive what I think” (L xxx.14). Hobbes confirms the 
reader’s suspicions in Leviathan’s “Review and Conclusion.” Hobbes claims that since 
universities “are fountains of civil and moral doctrine,” it would be good for the 
curriculum to adopt Leviathan as a central text (L RC.16). Provided that the universities 
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are free of “the venom of heathen politicians and from the incantations of deceiving 
spirits [namely, Aristotelianism],” the people who attend university should take up 
Hobbesian doctrines from these fountains and “sprinkle” what they learn on the general 
public (L RC.16). Having been acquainted with the curriculum of Hobbesian universities, 
subjects will find themselves less willing to “serve the ambitions of a few discontented 
persons” in rebellion and more willing to contribute to public defense (L RC.16). This 
adds yet another dimension to the general aims of Hobbesian education. The public’s 
commitment to serving critical national interests is won not by compulsion or blind 
patriotic faith—which can be easily misunderstood or rejected—but by the demonstrable 
truths of civil science. A properly educated Hobbesian populace would understand what 
is at stake when the civil peace is threatened. 
Hobbes outlines his conclusions about civil education with orchestrated 
braggadocio, in all likelihood actually intent on inviting the scorn of his targets. This 
reproachful attitude, of course, led to uproar (Bejan 2010: 608). The same intellectual 
luminaries of the period who chastised Hobbes for his unrepentant materialism and 
determinism also excoriated him for this university reform plan. John Wallis scoffed that 
Hobbes only wanted to jettison “Aristotelity” from the universities so that “Hobbeity” 
could take its place as the dominant philosophy (Bejan 2010: 608). Of course, Wallis is 





Contemporary Appraisals of Hobbesian Education 
In the contemporary scholarly literature, evaluations of Hobbes on education have 
centered on a notion I have elucidated here: Hobbes’ idea that subjects must be “truly 
taught” the principles of political theory (Lloyd 1997; Waldron 2001). As Hobbes 
himself recognized, there is indeed something very novel in the view that subjects ought 
to learn the truth about politics. The role of truth in Hobbesian education has been most 
closely considered in the work of Jeremy Waldron and S.A. Lloyd. 
In her 1997 paper, “Coercion, Ideology, and Education in Leviathan,” Lloyd 
argues that while we might object to the particular content of the Hobbesian education 
scheme, we might not so readily object to its structure (Lloyd 1997).3 While it is 
implausible that a contemporary person would want to submit themselves for education 
in a Hobbesian university or be a faithfully obedient subject of an absolute Hobbesian 
sovereign, the idea that the state should provide the subjects with true information critical 
to the state’s survival is not in itself very problematic—in fact, this principle is deeply 
connected with Rawls’ conclusions in Political Liberalism (Lloyd 1997: 54). Hobbesian 
education has much in common with a central ideal of contemporary liberal education: 
that children are not to be taught falsehoods (Lloyd 1997: 38-39, 58-59). Just as Hobbes 
thought teaching Aristotelian ethics was politically irresponsible, no right-minded 
contemporary education reformer would want children learning discredited 
pseudoscience or other such falsehoods. As such, the education program described in 
                                                        
3 Lloyd expands this same argument in “Fools, Hypocrites, Zealots, and Dupes: Civic 
Character and Social Stability,” Chapter 7 of Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes (Lloyd 1997: 295-356). 
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Leviathan is not “objectionably ideological”; Hobbes is not interested in fabricating a 
false dogma to pacify the subjects, he is interested in teaching the public what he took to 
be a momentous discovery—the rational principles of civil science (Lloyd 1997: 45-47, 
54-60).   
Jeremy Waldron has concurred with Lloyd that Hobbesian education has a 
surprisingly liberal quality (Waldron 1998). Waldron is particularly interested in aspects 
of Hobbes’ thought that seem to reflect the Rawlsian principle of publicity (Waldron 
2001: 448). For Rawls, one of the fundamental tenets of an ideal political order is the idea 
that politics must not be based on lies or myths about government or public institutions 
(Waldron 2001: 448). The grounds of state authority ought to be demonstrably true, and 
the public must be able to recognize these truths. Waldron argues that the Hobbesian 
education scheme, insofar as it offers something very close to this picture, meets Rawls’ 
criteria for the principle of publicity. 
Waldron also argues further that the Hobbesian education scheme has “respect” 
for individual reasoners (Waldron 2001: 469). Waldron points out that while the 
Hobbesian scheme does not have “respect” for reasoners in the sense of a guaranteed 
freedom of speech, Hobbes does seem to be alert to the possibility that the subjects will 
figure out the truth for themselves if the sovereign tries to make government mysterious 
(Waldron 2001: 468-469). The very fact that the sovereign must be open about the 
grounds of government is evidence that Hobbes took care to accommodate the savvy of 
individual reasoners into his political picture. Since the exposure of a political ruse can be 
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so destabilizing, it is better for the sovereign to tell the subjects the truth than to 
dissemble (Waldron 1998: 142-143). 
 Lloyd and Waldron have met rebuke from Teresa Bejan, who emphasizes that 
Hobbes merely intends the civil education program to provide a supplemental 
justification for obeying the law in cases where the subject’s fear of the sovereign is 
insufficient (Bejan 2010: 615). The principal force compelling obedience and 
maintaining the political order is the subjects’ fear of the sovereign’s power (Bejan 2010: 
615). Against Lloyd and Waldron, Bejan draws from Hobbes repeated use of the “clean 
paper” metaphor (EL II.9.8; L xxx.7) and characterizes the sovereign’s education scheme 
as “imprinting” (Bejan 2010: 620). The Hobbesian program for civil education is 
something akin to an indisputable secular faith to which all subjects will be taught the 
catechism (Bejan 2010: 618-620). 
All three of these authors give extensive treatment to the issue of the role of civil 
doctrines in Hobbes’ political system. However, they leave underexplored Hobbes’ hopes 
for the cultivation of the subject’s intellectual capacities. In what follows, I will give 
Hobbes’ account of speech, reason, and science and show that a Hobbesian subject ought 
to learn how to tell the difference between rationally grounded discourse and specious 
reasoning. I argue that being able to dogmatically recite the sovereign’s doctrines cannot 
suffice; knowing what makes rationally grounded discourse rationally grounded is a 
necessary precondition for Hobbes’ educational scheme to have its intended effect.  
Waldron’s claim that Hobbes shows “respect” for individual reasoners (Waldron 
2001: 469) does not completely align with Hobbes’ most salient worries. It is not that 
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people are so naturally endowed with reason that they will be able to determine whether 
or not the sovereign’s claim to authority is a ruse. The larger problem lies with the 
subjects’ lack of reasoning abilities. Hobbes is more concerned that an insufficiently 
educated public might not be rational enough to understand what is required to preserve a 
commonwealth. If public ignorance and the subjects’ failure to understand the grounds of 
sovereignty are indeed significant threats to public peace, it follows that at least some 
subjects must learn the proper use of ratiocination. Without this “acquired” skill as a 
component of Hobbesian education, the subjects have no litmus test for truth in politics, 
either of the sovereign’s own doctrines or of any other set of beliefs. 
 
Truth, “Acquired Wit,” and Civil Peace  
While a complete portrait of Hobbes on language is beyond the scope of this 
study, there are a number of aspects of Hobbes’ theory of language that are important for 
his hopes for a civil education of the public. The power of imposing names on things is 
supremely useful for all of the needs of a human community, but it is deleterious if used 
improperly (L iv.13). How does language lay these foundations for civil peace? What sort 
of discourse is capable of this feat? Hobbes’ exemplar for rational discourse is geometry, 
which he describes as one of the only precise sciences so far discovered (L iv.12). 
Arriving at truth requires “settling” the “significations” for terms on stable and plausible 
definitions and being meticulous about the logic of our inferences (L iv.11-13). This kind 
of Euclidean rigor, by virtue of its inexorable logic, has tangible effects when applied to 
political theory (cf. L xxx.5-6). Hobbes hopes that just as all individual reasoners 
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correctly following Euclid’s system land at identical conclusions, all reasoners following 
his system will achieve an analogous concord: identical conceptions of the true grounds 
of sovereignty. 
Hobbes calls this kind of geometric reasoning “ratiocination” (L v.2). When we 
ratiocinate with true affirmations, all we are doing is “reckoning”—that is “adding and 
subtracting”—the consequences of general names (L v.2). A syllogism, for Hobbes, is a 
“sum” of consequences of terms; the certainty of its conclusion depends on the stability 
and plausibility of the definitions employed (L v.1). If we can take all of the fixed terms 
that make up a particular field of knowledge and prove theorems from these definitions, 
the resulting proofs are what Hobbes calls a “science” (L v.17). This scientific discourse 
is not merely knowledge of particular facts or likelihoods, it “is the knowledge of 
consequences,” the sum of all of the syllogistically deduced theorems in a particular area 
of language (L v.17). Science proceeds to certain conclusions that all capable reasoners 
could rationally arrive upon and is perspicuously demonstrable from one person to 
another (L v.22). 
 It takes an education in language and reason to become versed in science—one 
must be learned in precise definitions and be able to set the definitions forth in a logical 
proof (L v.17). In chapter viii, Hobbes makes clear that ratiocination is not a skill people 
are born with; it is only learned with extensive practice. This distinction between “natural 
wit” and “acquired wit” is a recurring theme in Leviathan. Hobbes defines “natural wit” 
as good judgment, directedness of thinking, and mental quickness (L xiii.2-12). “Natural 
wit” is innate and is cultivated throughout life by experience, resulting in a type of 
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practical wisdom about particular situations Hobbes calls “prudence” (L viii.11). In 
Chapter xiii, just before he describes the state of nature, Hobbes discusses natural wit as 
one of those qualities in which human beings are fundamentally about equal (L xiii.1-2). 
Acquired wit, he reiterates, is developed exclusively through education (L viii.14). 
Training in the ability to draw truth from language is extremely fruitful for worldly 
concerns. Human progress and the benefits of the civil state are won through sound 
inferences (L v.20). “The light of human minds,” claims Hobbes, “is perspicuous 
words…by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; 
increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end” (L v.20). 
 
The Consequences of Irrational Speech: Absurdity, Sophistry, Civil Discord 
I have been outlining Hobbes’ concept of “acquired wit” and his sense of why this 
particular skill is so important. The contrast case with acquired wit is speech that signifies 
equivocally, refers to objects that do not exist, or uses private meanings of words. This 
kind of speech cannot bring about rational convergence on shared principles and is 
frequently the cause of civil unrest (L v.20).  
Abuses of speech often begin as mistaken or insufficiently stable concepts. If 
definitions are not kept meticulously distinct, an inquirer “will find himself entangled in 
words; as a bird in lime twigs” (L iv.12). The errors in a definition compound over the 
course of one’s reasoning and lead to absurdities (L iv.5). Hobbes took this kind of deeply 
entrenched absurdity to be the defining characteristic of the contemporary state of the 
sciences, particularly moral and political philosophy (L iv.13). Scholars who adhere to 
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false definitions and attempt to wring truth out of nebulous Aristotelian distinctions are 
like “birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, 
flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they 
came in” (L iv.13). This incoherence has led to public disagreement, and thus to conflict. 
How can the subjects of a Hobbesian system avoid this kind of speech? Among 
the primary sources of this problem is the phenomenon of “inconstant signification” (L 
iv.24). The seemingly straightforward process of characterizing behavior or naming 
objects can be fraught with inconsistencies. Hobbes argues that our private conceptions 
of the world are highly mutable—these conceptions depend to a large degree on our ever-
shifting emotions and bodily states (L iv.24). As a result, we have a tendency to apply 
different qualitative terms to the same objects, inevitably giving our speech “a tincture of 
our different passions” (L iv.24). This “tincture” is the source of many errors. Hobbes 
claims that there are a substantial number of words that we often treat as having a fixed 
meaning in nature, but are actually “inconstant.” Hobbes counts among these 
troublesome words “the names of the virtues and vices” (L iv.24). Words like “wisdom,” 
“stupidity,” “gravity,” and “prodigality” have equivocal significations, and cannot ever 
be admitted into “true grounds of any ratiocination” (L iv.24). Unless their definitions are 
fixed by the sovereign power, one ought not reason with “inconstant names” (L iv.7). 
Different reasoners will have different private definitions of these terms and will, 
accordingly, land at different conclusions, making conflict inevitable.  
Hobbes excoriates the Aristotelian tradition in particular for falling into this 
linguistic trap. In Leviathan xlvi Hobbes claims that Greek moral thought never 
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progressed beyond fixing “the rules of good and bad by their own liking and disliking” (L 
xlvi.11). This legacy has left the modern world full of irresolvable conflicts between the 
rival proclivities of private individuals—conflicts that have merely masqueraded as 
philosophical debate and never actually proceeded to the “theorems” of the “science of 
moral philosophy” (L xv.40).  
Another cause of incorrect reasoning is what Hobbes calls “insignificant” 
signification—cases where the concepts drawn upon have no basis in empirical 
observation (L iv.20). There are a variety of situations that fall into this category. One 
case is where two names which are irreconcilable are drawn together to form an illusory 
compound concept (L v.15). Examples of this include “incorporeal body,” “round 
quadrangle,” and “in-poured virtue” (L iv.21). Another common error involves positing 
the existence of universals (L v.12). For Hobbes, the consummate materialist, there is 
something very wrong in so hastily assuming the existences of so many abstract non-
entities—so many “nesses, tudes, and ties” (L viii.27). In “Of Darkness from Vain 
Philosophy and Fabulous Traditions,” Hobbes claims that part of the mistake lies in the 
Greek tradition’s hypostatization of the copula “is” (L xlvi.17). Hobbes goes so far as to 
argue that the idea of separated “essence” and other false notions speciously derived from 
the verb “to be” have been the cause of much despair and unnecessary conflict in human 
history. Mistaking the copula “is” as being indicative of “spirit” or immaterial “essence” 
has frightened people away from rightly understanding their political obligations (L 
xlvi.17). In particular, the scholastics’ fascination with “ghostly” power has served to 
maintain the superstitious ignorance of the common people (L ii.8-9). The public should 
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be educated to recognize that the supposedly “ghostly” force of ecclesiastical dictates 
manipulates them just “as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat, 
and a crooked stick” (L xlvi.18).  
Hobbes also warns about the obfuscating power of rhetorical tropes (L iv.24). As 
the work of Quentin Skinner and others has shown, Hobbes changed his attitudes toward 
the art of rhetoric throughout his career (Skinner 1996: 334; Johnston 1986: 66-68, 89). 
While a full treatment of the thorny issue of Hobbes on rhetoric is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is worthwhile to touch on what Hobbes found so worrisome about rhetoric. 
This issue further illuminates his larger worries about the relation between reason and 
politics. 
In the intellectual world of Elizabethan and Jacobean England in which Hobbes 
grew up, education for political life included learning how to generate emotive arguments 
rich in figurative language to appeal to the pathos of an audience (Skinner 1996: 26-40). 
After having produced the first English translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in 1628 and 
tutored the Cavendish children in what was then called “civil science,” Hobbes came to 
sharply reject the intellectual tradition of his youth (Skinner 1996: 256-257). Hobbes is 
scathing about rhetoric in Elements and De Cive. He claims that public speakers who 
inflame the passions of the populace with obfuscating metaphors and invocations of 
unfixed concepts are among the most pernicious threats to civil peace (EL II.8.14; DC 
xii.12). The problem with “eloquence” is that rhetoricians often knowingly argue from 
false, commonly held opinions and speak merely to win over “the present passions” of 
their audience (EL II.8.14). Hobbes’ fiery attitude toward rhetoric is much diminished in 
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Leviathan, where Hobbes reserves most of his barbs for Aristotelians and radical 
Protestants. Not only does Hobbes use a great many classical rhetorical tropes in 
Leviathan itself, he even claims, in the “Review & Conclusion” that reason alone is not 
sufficient to generate “attention and consent” of the listeners (L RC.1) and that reason and 
eloquence must be reconciled and made to support one another (L RC.4).4 
Nevertheless, Hobbes in Leviathan is still quite clearly concerned about the power 
of abused eloquence. Hobbes warns about the problems of eloquence in a public 
assembly, where speeches made without pause for clarifications and objections can have 
the effect of stirring an audience into a rebellious furor (L xxv.15). In Reason and 
Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Skinner identifies a leitmotif in Hobbes’ political 
writings that seems to be intended as a response to the powerful rhetorical trope of 
paradiastole, the formal strategy of making a virtue appear as a vice or a vice appear as a 
virtue (Skinner 1996: 10-11, 151). A commonly discussed feature of rhetoric in English 
Renaissance manuals of eloquence, paradiastole was widely feared because the 
rhetorician using it could hypothetically manipulate the audience’s opinions in whatever 
direction the speaker pleased. Skinner argues that we might find Hobbes’ concern about 
paradiastole in his theory of “inconstant names” (L ix.24), the very idea that moral 
philosophy ought to be a “science of virtue and vice” (DC iii.32; L xv.40), and the 
reasons given for why human societies are not like those of “ants and bees” (L xvii.10; 
Skinner 1996: cf. 279, 311, 343). For instance, when Hobbes bemoans the fact that 
                                                        
4 cf. Quentin Skinner’s focused discussion of Hobbes’ “changing conception of civil 
science,” especially with Leviathan (Skinner 2002: 85-86). 
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human beings, unlike ants and bees, have “the art of words” with which someone “can 
represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of 
good” (L xvii.10), Hobbes is specifically addressing the power of paradiastole to lead an 
audience astray (Skinner 1996: 343).  
Hobbes concludes Chapter v of Leviathan with the claim that all of these abuses 
of language “are like ignes fatui [a fool’s fire], and reasoning upon them is wandering 
amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt” (L 
v.20). Hobbes identifies a great variety of ways that speech can go wrong, turn up false 
principles, and lead to sedition. There are certain types of very common speech patterns 
that are inherently unstable, ambiguous, or simply nonsensical. As such, public peace in 
the Hobbesian commonwealth is held together by the meticulous adherence to the correct 
use of language. If this is the case, public discourse in an extant Hobbesian system is 
remarkably fragile. Even if a subject is educated in the grounds of the sovereign’s 
authority, these false types of speech are still very easy to fall prey to. Hobbes himself 
admits that language has an inescapably rough and imprecise quality. “All words are 
ambiguous,” he claims (L xxx.22). Misunderstanding is easy and there is plenty of 
interpretative ambiguity in speech for the sovereign’s signal to be lost or confused in its 





Ratiocination and the “Grounds and Reasons” of Sovereignty 
One remedy for this linguistic precariousness is that the sovereign in a Hobbesian 
system serves as the final arbiter of all disputes: whatever the sovereign decides is “right 
reason,” is “right reason” (L v.3). Hobbes begins his argument for this doctrine with the 
acknowledgment that individual reasoning is fallible (L v.3). Even people with excellent 
“acquired wit” can still make mistakes in any ratiocination, even basic arithmetic. One 
person’s certainty about a proposition does not make that proposition true; neither does 
the certainty of a large number of people (L v.3). In order to resolve disputes which 
would otherwise be interminable and lead to violence, the sovereign’s representative—a 
judge—must serve as neutral “arbitrator” (L v.3). Both parties to a dispute will agree to 
take the judge’s reason as “right reason.” This does not mean that the sovereign’s judge 
may be allowed to fabricate whatever sort of reason she desires. Any judge serving on 
behalf of the sovereign authority must follow the law of nature that commands that the 
verdict produced is as close as possible to being “consonant to natural reason and equity” 
(L xxvi.12). In cases where a judge has misreckoned the case, the decision does not stand 
as precedent, but can be cast aside to be corrected in future rulings (L xxvi.24). This 
aspect of Hobbes’ system acknowledges human fallibility and the need for an arbitrator 
to order public discourse and resolve disputes about otherwise ambiguous doctrines.  
It would appear as if the commonwealth’s peace could be preserved with this 
coordination between the sovereign’s coercive power to enforce its commands and the 
public education program, which attempts to standardizes public discourse to a single 
political position. I maintain that with these institutions alone, a Hobbesian 
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commonwealth is still vulnerable. 5 I argue that the public must also adopt the spirit of 
scientific reasoning. In what follows, I will make three arguments that show that a 
Hobbesian system needs its subjects to achieve “acquired wit.” First, acquired wit enables 
subjects to actually understand the logical progression of the reasons that ground the 
sovereign’s right. Second, acquired wit makes the subjects more resistant to the claims of 
any false, contentious speech, not just speech that directly contests the sovereign’s power. 
Third, acquired wit is necessary for subjects to properly draw moral inferences from the 
natural laws. After outlining how Hobbes’ doctrine system taken alone cannot meet these 
challenges without a Hobbesian public educated in the use of reason, I will draw out 
passages that confirm this reading and show that Hobbes himself was committed to 
having the subjects, including common people, cultivate an “acquired wit.” 
In Chapter xxx of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that subjects must be taught the 
“grounds and reasons” of the sovereign’s right (L xxx.4). Why must subjects be taught 
“grounds and reasons” and not merely a civil catechism? What is insufficient about 
something like “this is your sovereign, obey or face death”? The De Cive version of the 
“grounds and reasons” passage offers a useful elucidation. Subjects must be taught the 
“grounds and reasons” of sovereignty because “opinions are sown in men’s minds not by 
command but by teaching, not by threat of penalties but by clarity of argument” (DC 
xiii.9). Public opinions are rightly “sown” when the subjects are able to follow the valid 
arguments to their conclusions. The subjects attach themselves to the sovereign’s 
                                                        




“reasons” by virtue of their being reasons. Hobbes claims that those false doctrines to 
which the subjects are merely habituated are less likely to generate the public’s 
commitment than doctrines that are true and publicly demonstrated as such (DC xiii.9). 
What is the picture that emerges here? Hobbesian subjects must be publicly taught 
the perspicuous and valid arguments that ground the sovereign’s authority. Does this 
mean that the subjects only need “imprinting”—in Bejan’s sense—to able to parrot out 
the central propositions of Hobbesian political theory (Bejan 2010: 620)? This is 
implausible. Hobbes wants his subjects to know their political obligations by the “clarity 
of argument.” If the intention is to create a set of civil shibboleths, there would be no 
reason to teach the subjects “reasons” or emphasize discursive virtues like “clarity of 
argument.”  
In addition, since Hobbes makes clear that ratiocinative skill is “acquired,” and 
cannot be considered innate (L viii.13), the subjects must also need to attain a certain 
level of understanding of how arguments are supposed to work. This skill is required for 
truly understanding Hobbes’ doctrines. After all, when attempting to understand a 
geometric proof or a philosophical argument, one needs to know not only the particular 
content of each of the premises, but also the manner in which some conclusions follow 
and others do not. Without any education in ratiocination, a person encountering even a 
moderately complicated argument risks misinterpreting it as list of disjointed 
propositions. In fact, Hobbes indicates that this disjointedness is actually characteristic of 
how civil doctrines enter the public sphere. In Hobbes’ account of the role that 
universities play in public opinion, he describes true doctrines being “sprinkled” (L 
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RC.16) onto the populace by Sunday preachers and by daily conversation (L xxx.14). For 
the doctrine system and universities to have their intended effect, common people would 
have to be able to correctly align these fragments of political theory they pick up in 
everyday life into coherent arguments. 
Furthermore, as Waldron has remarked, Hobbes’ political theory is quite 
“counterintuitive” and is open to being very misunderstood (Waldron 2001: 457-458). 
Without proper training in ratiocinative skills, the nuanced arguments that ground the 
sovereign’s power might be otherwise indistinguishable from sophistry. For an 
uneducated Hobbesian subject, a false doctrine founded merely on uninformed opinions 
might appear more plausible than sound logic. These are destabilizing situations a 
sovereign clearly ought to avoid. 
 
Ratiocination and the “Public Enemy” 
Acquired wit is also necessary for the defense of the commonwealth from what 
Hobbes calls “the public enemy” (L xxiii.6). The character of the “public enemy” appears 
in a variety of guises in Leviathan. He can be one of “needy men, and hardy, not 
contented with their present condition” (L xi.4), or a rhetorician who “represents to others 
that which is good in the likeness of evil” (L xvii.10), or one of the “ecclesiastics” who 
seeks to “take from young men the use of reason by certain charms compounded of 
metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions” (L xlvii.27). Whatever the particular form, 
Hobbes’ reasoning about the “public enemy” problem works like this: if subjects are 
taught the grounds and duties of their rights, then they will have internalized a standard 
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by which they can judge the acceptability of doctrines that diverge from the sovereign’s. 
When the subjects hear a heterodox doctrine publicly proclaimed, they will be able to 
refer the public enemy’s discourse back to what they already know about the civil 
doctrines. This ability to compare against a clear transcript of acceptable doctrines gives 
the subjects a degree of intellectual tenacity. Rather than waiting for a dispute between 
doctrines to be judged in the sovereign’s public court, the subjects themselves will be 
able to choose how to doctrinally align themselves in their private deliberations. In a 
stable Hobbesian system, such a “public enemy” directly confronting the sovereign 
would have to overturn the Hobbesian subjects’ beliefs about government, overcoming 
the logical force of Hobbes’ own arguments. Such a person would have to undermine 
years of “services” at the civil Sabbath and the entire public doctrine system taught at the 
universities. 
 We can imagine a few ways a public enemy could evade these safeguards. One 
weak-spot in the commonwealth’s defenses is that language itself is too unwieldy to be 
comprehensively regulated. In Hobbes’ critique of false discourses like rhetoric and 
scholasticism, we saw how many easy pitfalls there are in everyday language use. A 
seemingly insignificant misfiring of a metaphor, or an inappropriate hypostatization, or 
emotive use of an “inconstant name” can be easily misinterpreted. As Hobbes remarks in 
the discussion of civil laws in Chapter xxvi, almost every word is subject to some kind of 
ambiguity (L xxvi.26). Even if the sovereign makes all laws pithy and unambiguous and 
fixes all unsettled significations, mistakes in public discourse are still quite possible. It is 
plausible that the natural ambiguity of even fixed terms could compound itself over time, 
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escaping the notice of the sovereign’s public ministers and eventually creating a scenario 
where a definition inspires public controversy. In such a scenario, the natural ambiguities 
of language could be manipulated to the advantage of a public enemy.  
 Another way a “public enemy” could side-step the Hobbesian doctrine system is 
by introducing a new, previously unjudged set of beliefs. Hobbes himself must have been 
familiar with this phenomenon. He himself lived in age in which the English populace 
was met with all manner of unfamiliar doctrines: radical religious creeds (L xlvi.37), new 
fears of witches (L ii.8), occultism in universities (L xlvi.29), and beliefs in magic (L 
xxxvii.9). How should a Hobbesian system respond to such falsehoods?  
Let us imagine a rapid arrival of a doctrine—a nascent theological movement, a 
pseudoscientific text, or some other such falsehood—that has not previously been subject 
to the sovereign’s judgment. Before the doctrine is brought for review, nothing in the 
commonwealth’s system of civil laws would explicitly outlaw it. In fact, the new belief 
would be licit under Hobbes’ own doctrine that grants liberty to the subjects in cases 
where the law is silent (L xxi.17). If it is eventually judged that the new doctrine does 
indeed stand in opposition to the sovereign, the sovereign’s ministers might be met with a 
difficult situation: a large segment of the population would be left holding a belief 
contrary to the sovereign’s judgement. One faction of the populace would be at odds with 
another, leading to confrontation. 
Simply knowing the “grounds and reasons” of the sovereign’s right and all of the 
other stipulated civil doctrines is not enough to counteract the effects of these ideological 
shifts. These cases show that false doctrines not explicitly banned in the Hobbesian 
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education scheme have the potential to spread widely and cause discord unless otherwise 
restrained. The content of the Hobbesian curriculum could never be broad enough to put 
blanket prohibitions on every false doctrine or corruption of language. Something else is 
needed. 
In a Hobbesian system where the populace has not learned “acquired wit,” the 
public enemy is able to side-step the intended force of the sovereign’s doctrine system. A 
“public enemy” could seize this opportunity and, by speaking to the “present passions” of 
the populace (EL II.8.14), sow civil discord. However, if the Hobbesian populace adopts 
a scientific spirit—the disposition to search for stable and plausible definitions, generate 
sound inferences, and jettison inconstant or insignificant speech from ratiocination—the 
body politic would be keener to ignore the allure of false doctrines. This is because such 
an educated populace would be more likely to recognize these challenges to the sovereign 
as false, and demonstrably so. The rhetorical or religious word-play of the public enemy 
character or the novel false doctrine would have no appeal because the subjects would be 
more apt to recognize unsound reasoning. Merely teaching the particular principles of 
Hobbesian theory can only serve as a standard for judgment when the public enemy’s 
false doctrine clearly conflicts with the sovereign’s established tradition. Education in 
“acquired wit” would give a Hobbesian system a defense mechanism for the subjects 
themselves to be able to confront and nullify the effects of false doctrines by referring 




There are a number of passages where Hobbes comes very close to advocating for 
such a public education in “acquired wit” to serve as a bulwark against the draw of 
falsehoods. Hobbes’ arguments on this point turn on the notion that people ignorant of 
reason and science are easy to manipulate. In Chapter ii of Leviathan Hobbes claims that 
“if this superstitious fear of [illusory] spirits were taken away…by which crafty 
ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are 
for civil obedience” (L ii.8). In Chapter v, Hobbes laments the fact that common people 
are not taught the use of reason and instead think that geometry is “conjuring” (L v.18). 
As a result of their ignorance of science and geometry, they “are in this point like 
children” and can be easily manipulated by the people around them to believe nonsense 
(L v.18). In Chapter xlvi, Hobbes explicitly claims that his purpose in proving Aristotle 
wrong is to relieve people of their irrational fears of “separated essences”; these fears 
have only made people more vulnerable to manipulation by would-be usurpers (L 
xlvi.18). 
In Chapter xi of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that ignorance of science forces people 
to depend on the false opinions of their peers (L xi.17). As is the case for those who take 
their ideas about politics from their fellow citizens “who plausibly seem wiser” (L 
xxx.14), this is particularly infelicitous because subjects will take the definitions given to 
them as right, even if they are nonsensical (L xi.18). Hobbes concludes that relying on 
unexamined received principles and not on reason and science increases the likelihood 
that people will fall into the trap of naming things merely according to their mutable 
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individual passions (L xi.19). Moreover, this ignorance of science makes people apt to 
believe in nonsense and be easily manipulated (L xi.23). 
  
 
“Acquired Wit” and “Moral Theorems” 
I have so far shown that “acquired wit” is necessary for subjects to understand 
Hobbes’ own doctrines and necessary for the subjects to reliably resist the “public 
enemy.” Next I will show that “acquired wit” is necessary for the subjects’ proper 
understanding of moral reasoning. In the passage justifying civil education in Leviathan 
Chapter xxx, Hobbes recognizes that a subject will not reliably obey the law out of fear of 
punishment alone; the subjects must themselves understand that their obedience to the 
sovereign is grounded upon “the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith” (L 
xxx.4). Hobbes argues here that if subjects understand the natural law of justice, they will 
understand what is at stake in their political obligation—namely, the civil state itself—
and therefore be less inclined to resist the sovereign’s authority. Since knowledge of the 
natural laws is knowledge of “the science of virtue and vice” (L xv.40), such an education 
in the sovereign’s right amounts to a special kind of moral education—a “scientific” 
moral education in the “theorems” of proper conduct (L xv.41). Just like the subjects’ 
public understanding of the logical force of the doctrine system, moral reasoning from the 
natural laws would also, for analogous reasons, require facility with the ratiocination. 
Of course, it is surely likely that a subject can know Hobbes’ natural law of 
justice and simply ignore it. Even rightly educated Hobbesian subjects can violate natural 
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law when they are overcome by their passions (L xxvii.13-18). However, Hobbes argues 
that it is also possible for a subject to err in behavior by drawing “erroneous inferences 
from true principles” (L xxvii.12). Hobbes alleges that this phenomenon of moral 
misreckoning is quite common among headstrong people who have an inflated opinion of 
themselves and do not realize that “good natural wit” is insufficient for moral judgement 
(L.xxvii.12). These people who err in this particular way do not realize that moral 
reasoning requires careful and meticulous study of the inferences they make (L.xxvii.12). 
If people have the skill of drawing inferences from principles, they would be less likely to 
commit infractions and threaten the public peace. 
Hobbes’ other discussions of public ignorance also have a connection to moral 
concerns. In the passage in Chapter v when Hobbes discusses common people’s 
ignorance of science, he specifically mentions this “ignorance” in connection with 
common people’s lacking “certain [true] rules of their actions” (L v.5). In the account of 
the natural laws in De Cive, Hobbes argues that there is a natural law against drunkenness 
because following the laws of nature requires that a subject always “maintain his ability 
to reason properly” (DC iii.25). Dimming one’s rational faculty by excessive drinking 
prevents one from drawing the proper moral conclusions from the natural laws (DC 
iii.25).  
 There is also a substantial discussion of failures of moral reasoning in Chapter xi 
of Leviathan that seems to directly connect with the issues discussed in Chapter xxx. 
Hobbes claims that when people are ignorant of the “causes and original constitution of 
right, equity, law, and justice,” they follow “custom” or legal “precedent” instead of 
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“reason” (L xi.21). The result of this tendency is particularly deleterious: people cite 
custom when reason is inconvenient, and cite reason when custom is inconvenient (L 
xi.21). This confused pattern of inconsistent moral and legal reasoning is responsible for 
interminable conflicts over “good” and “evil” (L xi.21). In considering how subjects are 
to understand moral reasoning, we can conclude that merely teaching the particular 
propositions of the natural laws would be insufficient for ensuring that the public would 
know how to draw the proper moral conclusions and “live in godliness and peace among 
themselves” (L xxiii.6). 
 
Conclusion 
I have shown in this paper that Hobbes’ scheme for civil education requires 
teaching the public the skill of ratiocination. However, it is important to qualify what 
exactly this conclusion gives us for a general characterization of Hobbes on education. 
For instance, Hobbes does not extend his hopes for the public’s use of reason into an 
argument for free inquiry. Unrestrained discourse and debate, especially in political 
theory, would surely be met with stern rebuke, or worse, from the sovereign’s censors. 
Hobbes would have also considered such free inquiry unnecessary. If Hobbes’ theory is 
true—which Hobbes believes it is—a commonwealth of cultivated reasoners would be 
inexorably drawn to accept Leviathan’s conclusions. Accordingly, Hobbes seems to 
believe that the subjects’ attaining the use of reason will not lead them astray. In fact, 
teaching reason will allow them to better follow Hobbes’ own arguments and keep them 
in lockstep with his conclusions (cf. L xxx.8).  
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It might seem clear that “public education for a more thoroughgoing absolutism” 
is not quite a cri-de-coeur for an “Enlightenment” spirit, at least not the Enlightenment 
spirit Waldron tries to evoke in his appraisal of Hobbesian education (Waldron 1998: 
143-144). However, Lloyd and Waldron are right that Hobbes’ commitment to teaching 
the public the truth about politics is not only a sharp break with the history of political 
thought—as Hobbes himself recognizes (DC P.1-10)—but is a policy that has much in 
common with contemporary values about the role of truth in modern liberal societies 
(Waldron 1998: 143; Lloyd 1997: 38-39, 45-46). Waldron calls Hobbes a “modern” and 
“a liberal thinker” because of Hobbes’ “respect for individuals as reasoning beings” 
(Waldron 1998: 143). As I have shown, Hobbes did not believe that people are naturally 
endowed with rational faculties, but did believe that reason could and should be taught. In 
fact, the very survival of a commonwealth depends on it. I believe that my claim that 
Hobbes wanted to teach the public the means for gaining truth further vindicates the 
Lloyd-Waldron characterization of the role of truth in Hobbesian education. The idea that 
subjects ought to learn the use of reason is at odds with Bejan’s reading of Hobbesian 
education as “imprinting” a civil faith on the minds of common people (Bejan 2010: 618-
620). In fact, the idea that Hobbes believes peace requires a populace schooled in the art 
of reasoning might even have a radical implication for our picture of the role of “common 
people” in a Hobbesian system. Since it is general public ignorance that makes subjects 
confused about the rights of sovereignty, vulnerable to the lies of a “public enemy,” and 
hasty in their moral reasoning, a substantial portion of the entire population would have 
to be included in the public teaching of ratiocination. If this is the case, Hobbes might 
  
44 
have been tacitly committed to a view that would have been truly radical both for his day 
and indeed for several centuries after the English Civil War—a view that all men and 
women, from the wealthiest to the poorest, can contribute to the public good by acquiring 
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